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1. Introduction
It is generally believed that patent protection helps to increase innovation by giving the
innovator property right on its innovation, yet some recent contributions show concern to this
belief. Roy Chowdhury (2005) shows that, under non-drastic innovation, if the marginal cost
difference between the innovating and non-innovating firms is small so that the tournament
effect
1 is negative, patent protection reduces innovation if the extent of knowledge spillover is
large. Mukherjee (2008) shows that patent protection reduces innovation in the presence of
product differentiation if the cost of doing innovation is sufficiently high and the market size
increases withthe number of products.
In this paper, we show a new way through which patent protection affects innovation.
Patent protection may reduce the final goods producers’ incentives for innovation in
industries with imperfectly competitive input markets, which allow the input suppliers to
extract the gain from innovation by adjusting the input prices. However, the input market
structure may playan importantrole in this respect.
To our surprise, the vast literature on patent protection
2 did not pay attention to the
imperfectly competitive input markets, which give the input suppliers’ market power.
Imperfect competition in the input market is perhaps an empirical regularity rather than
exception. For example, the presence of labour unions in many countries gives the workers
bargaining power in determining wages. As pointed out in Komiya (1975), the industries such
as iron and steel, petroleum refining, petrochemicals and certain other chemicals, cement,
paper and pulp and sugar refining, which produce inputs for several final goods, are
characterised by imperfect competition.
We consider two types of input market structure: (i) input suppliers are specific to the
final goods producers, and (ii) an industry-wide input supplier supplying inputs to all the final
goods producers. If one views the inputs as workers and the input suppliers as labour unions,
the first case represents decentralised unions and the second case represents a centralised
union. If the input suppliers are firms, the second case can also be interpreted as a situation
where the input suppliers are not specific to the final goods producers and cooperate to their
pricing strategies. In our analysis, we will call the input suppliers as labour unions. However,
our analysis will be valid even if the input suppliers are firms charging linear input prices.
In a simple model similar to Mukherjee (2008) but with no product differentiation, we
show that if there are firm-specific input suppliers, patent protection reduces innovation if the
number of firms producing under no patent protection is not very high, which occurs for
relatively higher cost of innovation. However, patent protection does not reduce the incentive
for innovation under an industry-wide input supplier.
2. The model and the results
Consider an economy with large number of firms. Each firm is able to invent a product
by investing K. However, how many innovators will be able to produce the product will
depend on the patent system of the economy.
3 If there is patent protection, ex-post
innovation, one of the innovating firms gets patent and becomes the sole producer of the
product. Hence, if n firms innovate, each innovator’s probability of getting the patent is
1
n
under the regime of patent protection. In contrast, if there is no patent protection, all
1 The tournament effect is the difference between the equilibrium payoffs of the firms in the presence and
absence of patent protection when all firms do R&D.
2 See Scherer (1980) and Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) for thorough discussions of the patent systems and their
consequences.
3 To prove our point in the simplest way, we ignore uncertainty in innovation. Therefore, all innovating firms
get the knowledge about the new product.
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innovating firms produce the product, and the products are perfect substitutes. For
simplicity, we assume that the new product is not competing with any existing product.
Our purpose of considering no existing competing product of the invented product and no
product differentiation among the producers of the invented product is to eliminate the
effects of the marginal cost difference of Roy Chowdhury (2005) and product
differentiation of Mukherjee (2008).
We assume that production requires a critical input, say, worker. Each producer
needs to hire workers from labour unions, which can be either firm-specific or industry-
wide. Assume that each final goods producer requires one worker to produce one unit of the
output. In order to capture the maximum effect of labour union, we assume that the labour
unions have full bargaining power. Assume that the reservation wage of each worker is c.
Assume that the inverse market demand function for the invented product is
P a q   , where P is price and q is the total output.
We consider the following game. Conditional on the patent system of the economy,
at stage 1, the firms decide whether to innovate or not. At stage 2, the wages are determined.
At stage 3, the innovating firms produce like Cournot oligopolists if there is no patent
protection and the profits are realised. However, if there is patent protection, at stage 3, the
patent holder produces like a monopolist and the profit is realised. We solve the game
through backward induction.
2.1. The benchmark case of no union
If there is no union, it is trivial that wage is c, and stage 2 of the above-mentioned game has
no real meaning.
If
np n firms innovate under no patent protection, all of them produce the product,
and given the demand function and the wage c, the equilibrium output and the net

























Under patent protection, even if
p n firms innovate, only the patent holder produces






 . Since each
innovating firm’s probability of getting the patent is
1
p n
, the net equilibrium profit of the ith












Proposition 1: Patent protection cannot reduce innovation in the absence of labour union.
Proof: Given the number of innovators n, the gross profit of the ith innovator under no
patent protection is lower than that of under patent protection, i.e.,
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1 n  , implying that the number of firms doing innovation cannot be lower under patent
protection than under no patent protection. ■    
Whether the incentive forinnovation is higher under no patent protection or under patent
protection depends on the trade-off between higher competition under the former and the
lower chance of becoming the monopolist producer under the latter. The loss from higher
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competition under no patent protection dominates the loss from the lower chance of
becoming the monopolist producer.
2.2. Firm-specific labour unions
Now consider the case of firm-specific labour unions.
Under no patent protection, if
np n firms innovate, the ith innovating firm,
1,2,...,
np i n  , maximises the following expression to determine its output:
( )
i
i i q Max a q w q   , (1)




















The labour union specific to the ith firm maximises the following expression to























































m m q Max a q w q   . (4)








The labour union specific to the patent holder maximises the following expression to
determine its wage:
















p n firms innovate under patent protection, the net equilibrium profit of the ith











  . (6)
Proposition 2: For a given n, if
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, patent protection reduces
innovation under decentralised unions.
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Proof: For a given number of innovators, the gross profit of the ith innovator under no
patent protection is greater (lower) than that of under patent protection, i.e.,
2 2 2
4
( ) ( ) ( )
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( 1) 16






* ( ) 11.445( .) n n approx    . Hence, if
* n n  , there are costs
of doing innovation, K, such that n firms innovate under no patent protection but not under
patent protection, implying innovation is lower under patent protection. ■  










, reduces as the number
of producer increases, the presence of firm-specific labour unions creates a wage effect along
with the effects mentioned in Subsection 2.1. Hence, no patent protection creates a positive
effect on the firms by reducing their wages compared to patent protection. If the product
market under no patent protection is not very competitive, the beneficial wage effect along
with the uncertainty in getting the patent under the regime of patent protection outweighs the
negative competition effect under no patent protection, thus reducing innovation under
patent protection. Otherwise, i.e., for a very competitive product market under no patent
protection, patent protection increases innovation.
2.3. The industry-wide labour union
Now consider the case of an industry-wide labour union, which supplies workers to all firms
and charge the wage, w. If
np n firms innovate under no patent protection, the ith innovating
firm, 1,2,...,
np i n  , maximises the following expression to determine its output:
( )
i
i q Max a q w q   . (7)










The industry-wide labour union maximises the following expression to determine w:
  ( )
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np w





























Since under patent protection, only the patent holder produces the product, the
analysis under patent protection is the same under firm-specific labour unions and the
industry-wide labour union. Hence, the net equilibrium profit of the ith innovating firm
under patent protection is given by (6).
Proposition 3: Patent protection cannot reduce innovation under an industry-wide labour
union.
Proof: For a given number of innovator, the gross profit of the ith innovator under no patent
protection is lower than that of under patent protection, i.e.,
2 2
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, for n > 1.
Hence, innovation cannot be lower under patent protection. ■ 
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Under an industry-wide labour union, wages are the same irrespective of the patent
system. It is worth mentioning that, it follows from Dhillon and Petrakis (2002) that this
result is not due to our assumption of a liner demand curve. Hence, the wage effect
mentioned in Section 2.2 is not present under an industry-wide labour union, and following
the intuition behind Proposition 1, it is easy to understand that patent protection cannot
reduce innovation compared to no patent protection in this situation. Propositions 1 and 2
show the role of the unionisation (or the input market) structure in determining the effect of
patent protection on innovation in the presence of imperfectly competitive input markets.
3. Conclusion
We show a new way through which patent protection affects innovation. Patent protection
may reduce the incentive for innovation under firm-specific input suppliers. However, patent
protection cannot reduce innovation if there is an industry-wide input supplier.
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